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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 08-4229
_____________
LAURIE L. DURANEY,
Appellant
v.
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION,
as Receiver for Washington Mutual Bank F.A.;
SHAPIRO & KREISMAN LLC; KEVIN DISKIN, ESQ.;
MEGAN D.H. SMITH, ESQ.; LINDSEY HANSEN

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 07-cv-00013)
District Judge: Honorable David Stewart Cercone

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
July 16, 2010
Before: RENDELL, JORDAN and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges.
(Filed: August 2, 2010)

OPINION OF THE COURT

RENDELL, Circuit Judge.
This case arises out of a mortgage foreclosure action filed in Pennsylvania state
court by Washington Mutual Bank against Laurie Duraney, and involves Duraney’s

claims regarding the conduct of Washington Mutual and its law firm in collecting the
money that Duraney owed the bank. Subsequent to the foreclosure, Duraney filed the
instant action in federal court against Washington Mutual, its law firm, Shapiro &
Kreisman LLC (“S&K”), and three S&K employees, asserting claims under the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692p, and various state law
causes of action.
On January 31, 2008, the District Court dismissed several of plaintiff’s claims
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The Court held that plaintiff’s breach of
contract and bad faith claims against Washington Mutual, her so-called claim for “joint
and several liability” against all defendants, and her claims against all defendants under
Pennsylvania’s Fair Credit Extension Uniformity Act, 73 Pa. Stat. §§ 2270.1-2270.6, and
Pennsylvania’s Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, 73 Pa. Stat.
§§ 201-1 to 201-9, were barred by res judicata because of the state court’s disposition of
her mortgage foreclosure action. The Court further held that plaintiff’s claims for
injunctive relief were barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, that her libel and slander
claims against Washington Mutual failed because the bank’s statements were truthful, and
that her libel and slander claims against all defendants were barred by Pennsylvania’s
doctrine of absolute immunity for statements made in the course of judicial proceedings.
On September 11, 2008, the Court granted defendants’ motions for summary
judgment on the remaining claims, dismissing plaintiff’s FDCPA claims because
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Washington Mutual was not a “debt collector” under the FDCPA and because the
statements made by S&K and its employees were not deceptive. The Court also denied
plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment.
On September 25, two weeks after the District Court entered judgment in
defendants’ favor, the Office of Thrift Supervision closed Washington Mutual and
appointed the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) as receiver pursuant to 12
U.S.C. § 1821(c). On October 11, plaintiff appealed the District Court’s judgment. The
FDIC moved to be substituted for Washington Mutual, and moved to stay proceedings
before our Court to allow plaintiff the opportunity to file an administrative claim against
Washington Mutual with the FDIC. We granted both motions.
On December 24, plaintiff filed claims with the FDIC for attorneys’ fees related to
the state court foreclosure action and the instant case. The FDIC denied this claim on the
basis that plaintiff had not shown that Washington Mutual had violated any laws during
the foreclosure process. However, plaintiff’s administrative claim did not set forth any of
the claims being pursued by plaintiff in the instant litigation.
On appeal, plaintiff contends that the District Court erred in granting defendants’
motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment. Before reaching the merits of
these rulings, we must consider a jurisdictional argument raised by the FDIC for the first
time on appeal. Since the FDIC was appointed only after the District Court entered its
judgment, the FDIC did not have the opportunity to present this argument to the District
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Court. Nonetheless, as this argument goes to our jurisdiction, the FDIC is entitled to raise
it now. See In re Kaiser Group Int’l Inc., 399 F.3d 558, 565 (3d Cir. 2005) (“It is
well-settled law that subject matter jurisdiction can be challenged at any point before final
judgment, even if challenged for the first time on appeal.”).1
The FDIC contends that we lack jurisdiction to review plaintiff’s claims against
Washington Mutual because she failed to assert them before the FDIC during the
administrative claims process. Under 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d), the statute that governs the
FDIC’s powers and responsibilities once it is appointed as receiver for a failed bank, the
FDIC has wide latitude to administer the bank’s assets, and claims against those assets.2
The statute requires the FDIC to give notice to the bank’s creditors to present their claims
to the FDIC by a deadline specified by the FDIC, and mandates that the FDIC “determine
whether to allow or disallow the claim” within 180 days of a claim being filed.
§ 1821(d)(3), (d)(5). Where a claimant has failed to make a timely claim, the claim “shall
be disallowed and such disallowance shall be final.” § 1821(d)(5)(C)(i). The statute also
contains a provision constraining judicial review of claims against the failed bank: “no
1

To the extent that the FDIC is correct that we lack jurisdiction to review
plaintiff’s claims against Washington Mutual and the FDIC, we nonetheless “have
jurisdiction to determine our jurisdiction,” Drakes v. Zimski, 240 F.3d 246 (3d Cir. 2001),
and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to review plaintiff’s claims against the
other defendants.
2

We have explained that this statute is designed to enable the receiver “to dispose
of the bulk of claims against failed financial institutions expeditiously and fairly.” Praxis
Props., Inc. v. Colonial Sav. Bank, S.L.A., 947 F.2d 49, 64 (3d Cir. 1991) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
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court shall have jurisdiction over . . . any claim or action for payment from . . . the assets
of any depository institution for which the [FDIC] has been appointed receiver,” except as
otherwise provided for by statute. § 1821(d)(13)(D). However, judicial review is
permitted where the FDIC has disallowed a claim, but this exception applies only where
the specific claim under review was presented to, and disallowed by, the FDIC.
§ 1821(d)(7)(A); Rosa v. Resolution Trust Corp., 938 F.2d 383, 391-92 (3d Cir. 1991).
This exception thus does not apply to the claims here.
The FDIC therefore argues that we lack jurisdiction to consider Duraney’s claims
against Washington Mutual (and, by extension, against the FDIC as receiver for
Washington Mutual) because she failed to raise them in the administrative claims process.
We agree. The elements of the bar on judicial review provided by § 1821(d)(13)(D) are
clearly satisfied here. There is no dispute that Washington Mutual is a “depository
institution” for which the FDIC “has been appointed receiver,” or that Duraney’s action
seeks “payment from” those assets. Duraney does not contend that she complied with the
FDIC’s administrative process with respect to the claims asserted in this case, and she
does not attempt to invoke the statutory provision for judicial review of claims denied by
the FDIC.3 To the contrary, there is no dispute that Duraney failed to file an
administrative claim with the FDIC based on the causes of action asserted before the

3

Duraney does not seek review of the FDIC’s decision to deny her claim for
attorneys’ fees related to the mortgage foreclosure action.
5

District Court, or that the elements of the jurisdictional bar are satisfied in this case.
Instead, Duraney raises the following three principal arguments against the
application of the jurisdictional bar, none of which have merit. First, she contends that
the jurisdictional bar should not apply because the District Court’s judgment predated
Washington Mutual’s entry into receivership and because the FDIC had notice of her
claims as a result of the litigation in the District Court. However, she cites no authority
that supports these propositions, and we have found nothing in § 1821 that precludes the
application of the jurisdictional bar under these circumstances. Second, she contends that
the application of this provision would undermine the finality of judgments. This concern
is adequately addressed by § 1821(d)(13)(A), which requires the FDIC to “abide by any
final unappealable judgment of any court of competent jurisdiction which was rendered
before the [FDIC’s] appointment.” However, this provision is not triggered here, as there
was no “unappealable judgment” rendered before the FDIC’s appointment. Third, she
cites to § 1821(d)(5)(F)(ii), which provides that “the filing of a claim with the receiver
shall not prejudice any right of the claimant to continue any action which was filed before
the appointment of the receiver.” However, this section of the statute is inapplicable here,
as the FDIC does not base its jurisdictional argument on the fact that Duraney filed an
unrelated claim with the FDIC. We therefore agree with the FDIC that we lack
jurisdiction to review Duraney’s claims against Washington Mutual or against the FDIC
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as receiver.4
We also find Duraney’s arguments with respect to the S&K defendants to be
without merit, substantially for the reasons set forth by the District Court in its thoughtful
and well-reasoned opinions. Among other things, the District Court correctly found that
the S&K defendants’ communications to plaintiff and her attorney were not deceptive and
were protected by absolute immunity.5
We have reviewed plaintiff’s remaining arguments and find them to be without
merit. We will therefore dismiss the appeal with respect to plaintiff’s claims against
Washington Mutual and the FDIC, and will otherwise affirm the orders of the District
Court.
4

Even if we were to consider plaintiff’s claims against Washington Mutual on
their merits, we would affirm the District Court’s judgment for substantially the reasons
set forth by the Court in its rulings on Washington Mutual’s motion to dismiss and motion
for summary judgment.
5

On March 9, 2010, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania reinstated plaintiff’s
appeal of the trial court’s decision in the mortgage foreclosure action brought by
Washington Mutual, and in a decision issued on July 7, the court remanded one issue
from that appeal for further proceedings. Although this result could arguably undermine
the District Court’s res judicata and collateral estoppel rulings, we conclude that it has no
effect on the outcome of this appeal, because the claims that were dismissed by the
District Court on the basis of res judicata or collateral estoppel were also subject to
dismissal on alternative grounds. First, as discussed above, we lack jurisdiction over the
claims against Washington Mutual. Second, we agree with the S&K defendants that
plaintiff’s claims under the Fair Credit Extension Uniformity Act and the Unfair Trade
Practices and Consumer Protection Law were without merit because the communications
that plaintiff challenges as deceptive were made “in connection with the filing or service
of pleadings or discovery or the prosecution of a lawsuit,” 73 Pa. Stat. § 2270.3, and are
thus outside the ambit of those statutes. Third, we agree with the District Court that “joint
and several liability,” which is labeled as the ninth count of plaintiff’s Complaint, is not
an independent cause of action.
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